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THE "CSI EFFECT" AND OTHER FORENSIC
FICTIONS
By Kimberlianne Podlas*
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, several newspaper and magazine articles have warned that a
"CSI Effect" is impacting our criminal justice system.' According to these
reports, the television drama CSI: Crime Scene Investigation is seducing
jurors with promises of forensic evidence, thereby causing an epidemic of
unjustified acquittals.'
Notwithstanding the popularity of such claims, they are not grounded
in case studies or statistical data of increases in acquittals. Rather, they are
based on anecdotes about cases wherein law enforcement lost its case while
believing it should have won.3 However, anecdotes are not an adequate
substitute for empirical evidence or a logical theory of media influence.
Though research shows that some televised depictions of law
enforcement can influence people's beliefs about the legal system, 4 not
every depiction does so. Moreover, even where one does, its effect is
limited by how viewers interpret its dominant message. Consequently,
* Assistant Professor of Media Law and Director of the Carolina Film & Video Festival,
University of North Carolina at Greensboro; B.A. 1988, SUNY Buffalo; J.D. 1991, SUNY
Buffalo.
1. See, e.g., Max M. Houck, CSI: Reality, SCI. AM., July 2006, at 85; Kit R. Roane, The
CSI. Effect, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 25, 2005, at 50.
2. Houck, supra note 1; Roane, supra note 1; Jennifer Rosinski & David Weber, DAs: CS!
Effect Spoiling Jurors, BOSTON HERALD, Nov. 12, 2004, at 2; Richard Willing, CSI Effect Has
Juries Wanting More Evidence, USA TODAY, Aug. 5, 2004, at A1.
3. See Margaret Lillard, Study: TV's Effect on Jury Behavior Limited, SUN NEWS (Myrtle
Beach, S.C.), Feb. 16, 2006, at C4, available at http://www.myrtlebeachonline.com/mld/
myrtlebeachonline/news/local/13884902.htm (describing perceptions of law enforcement and
prosecutors).
4. See Kimberlianne Podlas, Blame Judge Judy: The Effects of Syndicated Television
Courtrooms on Jurors, 25 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 557 (2002) [hereinafter Blame Judge Judy]; see
also MICHAEL ASIMOW & SHANNON MADER, LAW AND POPULAR CULTURE 11 (2004);
RICHARD K. SHERWIN, WHEN LAW GOES POP, THE VANISHING LINE BETWEEN LAW AND POP
CULTURE 6-8 (2000) (discussing proliferation of pop legal culture and its impact on legal
understandings).
88 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:87
since CSI's narrative focuses on police catching bad guys and celebrates
forensics as infallible, it is not clear whether CSI helps or harm prosecutors.
Guided by media theory, this Article analyzes claims of the CSI
Effect from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. After describing
the operation of the CSI Effect and its alleged impact, this Article
summarizes the effects-based literature explaining the entertainment
media's contribution to the public's understanding of the law. Applying
this body of research, this Article subjects claims of a CSI Effect to a set of
empirical investigations. The first portion of the investigation surveys
assistant district attorneys ("ADAs") regarding their beliefs in, and
personal experience with a CSI Effect. While most ADAs believe an effect
exists and has thwarted their own prosecutions, this Article shows that the
majority of these cases resulted in convictions, thus disproving any CSI
Effect. The second portion of the investigation is a plausibility study of the
CSI Effect in which 538 mock jurors (comprised of 98 individuals on jury
duty, 134 jury eligible adults, and 306 university students) deliberated to a
verdict and identified (from a list) any reasons influencing it. The
researcher then measured the CSI viewing habits of the mock jurors and
scrutinized their verdict lists for evidence that CSI-oriented factors had
entered into their decision-making. Presumably, frequent viewers of CSI
operating under a CSI Effect would rely on CSI factors in their verdicts
whereas infrequent viewers of the genre would not.
Contrary to the hype, the empirical data does not support the
existence of a CS! Effect-at least not one that perverts guilty verdicts into
wrongful acquittals. Indeed, the data shows that CSI-viewing mock jurors
did not rely on CSI factors in reaching their verdicts (to any greater degree
than did their non-viewing counterparts). In fact, only a very small portion
of either group referenced such factors at all. Accordingly, it does not
appear that there is a CSI Effect in light of the empirical data.
II. THE CSI EFFECT
A. CSI: Crime Scene Investigation
To understand the CSI Effect, one must first understand the nature of
its namesake television series-CSI: Crime Scene Investigation. CSI is an
hour-long drama featuring a police forensics team that investigates
murders. Each episode begins with the discovery of a dead body,
5. See generally MIKE FLAHERTY & CORRINE MARRINAN, CSI CRIME SCENE
INVESTIGATION COMPANION (Anthony Zuiker ed., New York: Pocket Books 2004).
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launching a criminal investigation.6 The team, usually after rejecting a
false lead, identifies the culprit using a number of scientific techniques.
7
Moreover, the individuals comprising the CSI team are not only forensic
technicians, but also police detectives. They question witnesses, round up
possible suspects, and partner with district attorneys to charge suspects
with crimes.
8
Since its premiere, CSI: Crime Scene Investigation has distinguished
itself among television programs. It has been the top-rated drama since
2001,9 earned several Emmy nominations,' ° spawned the genre of
television procedurals,1" and increased interest in college science
programs. 12 In spite of its achievements, CSrs legacy resembles the
criminals it portrays more than the paragon of justice it celebrates.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See generally id. (describing the history of the series and detailing the first four seasons
of episodes).
9. Jim Benson, Fall Drama, BROADCASTING & CABLE, May 22, 2006, at 9; Paul J. Gough,
Fox Places Four Shows in Top 10, HOLLYWOOD REP., May 17, 2006, at 4 (reporting 27 million
total viewers); Gary Levin, Numbers Add Up For No. 1 CBS; Young Adults Go to Fox a 2nd
Year, USA TODAY, May 25, 2006, at 3D (estimating a 25.2 rating). "One household share point
is 1% of the U.S. households watching TV, or 1.09 million households. The U.S. has 109.6
million TV households." Claire Atkinson, CSI, Pegged As Share Leader For Fall Season,
ADVERTISING AGE, May 26, 2006, at 37.
10. In 2005, CSI was nominated for Outstanding Direction; in 2002, 2003, and 2004, it was
nominated for Outstanding Drama; in 2001 and 2003, Marg Helgenberger was nominated for
Lead Actress in a Drama. Awards for "CS: Crime Scene Investigation", Internet Movie
Database, http://imdb.com/title/tt0247082/awards (listing CSI's award nominations and wins
since it began airing). It won the 2006 Emmy for Outstanding Cinematography for a Single-
Camera Series, and the 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006 People's Choice Award for Dramatic Series.
Id.
11. This includes spin-offs CS! Miami and CSI New York. See Sid Smith, The Pros and
Cons of 'CSI' Spinoffs, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 12, 2006, available at http://metromix.chicagotribune.
com/tv/mmx-0602120046feb l2,0,275304.story?coll=mmx-televisionheds.
12. Jessica Fender, TV Guided: Popular Shows Influence Students' Career
Choices, ADVOCATE, July 17, 2006, at A01. Enrollments in George Washington University's
graduate forensic science program increased 100% between 1999 and 2002, and enrollments in
West Virginia University's undergraduate forensic science undergraduate program increased
400% between its 1997 inception and 2005. See generally id.
2007]
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B. The CSI Effect
Recently, CS! has been attributed with causing a rash of unjustified
acquittals, exerting on trials what is called the CSI Effect. 13 In its simplest
formulation, the CSI Effect refers to CSI's impact on juror decision
making.' 4 Allegedly, CSI causes jurors to interpret the absence of forensic
evidence negatively against the prosecution resulting in a wrongful
acquittal.
1 5
The CSI Effect is premised on the juxtaposition of television's
presentation of forensic investigation and its reality. Even though forensic
evidence is prevalent on CSI, 16 it is a factor in only a small portion of real-
life cases.17  Additionally, many of the techniques shown on CSI do not
exist. 18 Moreover, forensic scientists complain of "the perception of near
infallibility of forensic science after watching a few episodes of CSI."'19
Proponents of a CSI Effect believe that the show instills in its viewers
unreasonable expectations about the commonality of forensic evidence and
teaches them that proof of guilt is just a simple forensic test away. 20 Thus,
when viewers weaned-on CSI become jurors, they will expect the
prosecution to present forensic evidence as a prerequisite to conviction. If
a prosecutor does not supply such evidence--even if it is irrelevant or
supplanted by testimonial evidence-jurors will equate its absence with
reasonable doubt and they will wrongfully acquit.2' According to a Peoria
13. Houck, supra note 1; Roane, supra note 1.
14. Kimberlianne Podlas, The "CS1 Effect": Exposing the Media Myth, 16 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 429, 430-31 (2006) [hereinafter Exposing the Media Myth].
15. Tom R. Tyler, Viewing CSI and the Threshold of Guilt: Managing Truth and Justice in
Reality and Fiction, 1 !5 YALE L.J. 1050, 1078 (2006) (noting that prosecutors believe CSI causes
jurors to acquit when they should convict); Houck, supra note 1; Rosinski & Weber, supra note
2; John Sharp, Beeney Case Shocks Police: East Peoria Police Chief Says TV Crime Shows Are
Affecting Real-Life Trials, PEORIA J. STAR, June 25, 2005, available at
http://www.pjstar.com/stories/062505/TRl-B6Q4JRJU.061.shtml.
16. Exposing the Media Myth, supra note 14, at 431, 453; see also Panel Three: The Role of
Scientific Evidence, 80 IND. L.J. 69, 87 (2005) (noting the popularity of useful forensic evidence
on CSI).
17. Contra Craig Cooley, Reforming the Forensic Science Community to Avert the Ultimate
Injustice, 15 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 386 n.34 (2004) [hereinafter Reforming the Forensic
Science Community].
18. Matthew T. Mangino, The "CSI Effect", PA. L.WKLY., Mar. 6, 2006, at 8.
19. Rick Weiss, Science: Notebook, WASH. POST, Feb. 21, 2005, at A 13 (quoting Max
Houck of West Virginia University).
20. Craig Cooley, Forensic Individualization Sciences and the Capital Jury: Are
Witherspoon Jurors More Deferential to Suspect Science Than Non- Witherspoon Jurors?, 28 S.
ILL. U. L.J. 273, 322-23 (2004) [hereinafter Forensic Individualization Sciences].
21. See Simon Cole & Rachel Dioso, Law and the Lab, WALL ST. J., May 13, 2005, at W 13.
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prosecutor, presenting less evidence than viewers see on TV "is viewed as
reasonable doubt.",22  Furthermore, besides requiring forensic
corroboration, CSI might cause jurors to demand that such proof exhibit a
23certain degree of sophistication. Where the prosecution presents forensic
evidence that does not resemble CSI's standard, jurors might discount it.
This may also "mak[e] it tough for the government to prove cases. 24
Some believe that this elevates juror expectations to beyond the
already-high burden of proof,25 thereby leading to acquittals. 26  If jurors
require forensic evidence to convict-regardless of the strength of
testimonial evidence or relevance of forensics the prosecution's burden
may rise from proof "beyond a reasonable doubt" to "beyond all doubt. 27
One prosecutor claimed, "We're hearing stories where people, jurors will
come back and say: 'There was no DNA test. I expected that. And without
that I'm not convinced.'
' 28
22. Roane, supra note 1. Another prosecutor complained that "[jurors] expect it to look like
it does on television." Houck, supra note 1, at 85. A police investigator echoed, "On TV, it's all
slam-dunk evidence .... Now juries expect the same thing-and that's a big problem." Roane,
supra note 1, at 49.
23. Michael Pritchard, 'CS[ Effect' Lifts Burden of Proof for Prosecutors, PRESS OF
ATLANTIC CITY, Feb. 27, 2006, at C1 (noting that jurors expect that prosecutors will present
"sophisticated" forensic evidence); Janine Robben, The "CS! Effect": Popular Culture and the
Justice System, 66 OR. ST.B. BULL. 8, 8 (2005) (elaborating on certain type "of conclusive
evidence they see on CS"').
24. Martha Graybow, Prosecutors See 'CS! Effect' in White-Collar Cases, Sept. 24, 2005,
http://www.redorbit.com/modules/news/tools.php?tool=print&id=250029 (discussing juror
expectations of forensics); See also Pritchard, supra note 23.
25. This presumes that the prosecution regularly obtains convictions by proving guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt burden, rather than by meeting some lesser standard.
26. Those who believe in the CS! Effect believe that TV creates a higher standard of proof
that translates to acquittal. See Tyler, supra note 15, at 1076.
27. Id.; Mangino, supra note 18. One prosecutor lamented, "The burden [CS1] places on us
is overwhelming." Roane, supra note 1, at 50. Heightening the prosecution's burden of proof,
however, may merely correctly recalibrate it with the standard of beyond a reasonable doubt, thus
bringing a diminished standard closer to its constitutional requirement.
28. Cole & Dioso, supra note 21. Tyler has argued that the syllogism of the CS! Effect
contradicts the motivation of viewers to watch CS!, i.e., their desire to see "enactments of certain
truth and justice." Tyler, supra note 15, at 1067. This motivation should make it easier for the
prosecution to meet its burden (or more difficult for the defense to convince jurors of reasonable
doubt). Consequently, "if viewers respond to this stimulus by raising the bar and acquitting the
wrongdoers, then reality fails to match fiction." Id.
2007)
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Importantly, the CSI Effect 29 asserts neither that the absence of
forensic evidence might tip the scales in an otherwise close case, nor that
when forensic evidence is introduced at trial, jurors might scrutinize it
more closely than in the past. Though CSI might exact these side-effects,
the effect law enforcement complains of and that dominates the media, is
that in the face of overwhelming proof of guilt, jurors will wrongly
acquit.30
C. Evidence of the CSI Effect
Despite the magazine covers and newsprint pages warning of a CS!
Effect,31 there is "not a shred of evidence" to back it up.32  Rather, it
appears that the CSI Effect better resembles an urban legend among
prosecutors and police officers that has gained credence through
repetition.33
To date, the only proof of a CSI Effect is that some individuals
believe in one. The study commonly cited to support the effect is a survey
by an Arizona prosecutor of other Arizona prosecutors revealing that a
majority of Arizona prosecutors believe in a CSI Effect.34 To buttress this
29. Although the anti-prosecution CSI Effect dominates the media, other incantations of the
CSI Effect include an anti-defense or pro-prosecution effect (where CS! helps the prosecution or
harms the defense), an increased interest effect (where CSI causes the public to be more interested
in forensics either as presented at trial or as a potential career), and the effect of believing in the
CSI Effect. For a detailing of these alternate CSI Effects, see Exposing the Media Myth, supra
note 14, at 431-33. District attorneys have also begun "grumbling about a new kind of CSI
effect" that CS! teaches criminals how to hide their criminal deeds. Leonard Post, 'CSI Effect' on
Crooks Seen by Prosecutors, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 13, 2006, at 4.
30. A homicide investigation supervisor explained, "Our biggest fear is that what these
shows will mainly do is that these people will start getting acquitted." Enric Volante & Kim
Smith, 'CSI Effect' Impacts Justice in Tucson, ARIZ. DAILY STAR, May 8, 2005, at 19.
31. See generally Houck, supra note 1; Ellis Henican, TV Crime Shows Teach Criminals
Only So Much, NEWSDAY, Mar. 24, 2006, at A2; Linda Deutsch, TV Distorting Jurors'
Expectations?, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 15, 2006, at A9; Melissa Dribben, Trial by 'CS!': Jurors
Influenced by the Popular TV Shows Increasingly Demand Prime-Time-Style Evidence - and
Lawyers Must Adjust, PHILA. INQUIRER, Feb. 19, 2006, at M1; Attorneys Fight 'CS! Effect',
AUGUSTA CHRON., Nov. 25, 2006, at B3; Criminal Law: The CS! Effect, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER,
May 23, 2005, at 2; Roane, supra note 1; Willing, supra note 2; Mangino, supra note 18; Vince
Gonzales, Prosecutors Feel the "CSI Effect", CBS NEWS, Feb. 10, 2005, available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/02/l0/eveningnews/main673060.shtml; Carlene Hempel,
TV's Whodunit Effect: Police Dramas Are Having an Unexpected Impact in the Real World,
BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 9, 2003, at 13.
32. Cole & Dioso, supra note 21.
33. Walt Belcher, College Teacher Finds Some Evidence Debunking Alleged "CSI Effect"
on Verdicts, TAMPA TRIB., Feb. 16, 2006, at 4.
34. Maricopa County (AZ) Attorney's Office, CS: Maricopa County: The CSI Effect and
Its Real-Life Impact on Justice, June 30, 2005, available at http://www.maricopacountyattorney.
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perception, prosecutors 35 have pointed to the acquittal of Robert Blake as
evidence of the CSI Effect in action.3 6 This acquittal, however, may not
reflect a miscarriage of justice A la CSI Effect, but legitimate doubts about
the evidence or weaknesses in the prosecution's case: "[F]or all we know,
the jurors in such cases have felt genuine reasonable doubt, not a 'CS'
version of it."'37 Indeed, at least one legal commentary deemed the Blake
case a classic reasonable doubt scenario.38 Furthermore, one of the two
jurors initially skeptical of Blake's innocence 39 told the Los Angeles Times
that she acquitted due to the testimony of two prosecution witnesses who
saw Blake walking alone away from the restaurant minutes before the 911
call, combined with the reasonableness of Blake's alibi. 40 This casts doubt
on claims that Blake's acquittal was a function of the misinterpretation of
absent forensic evidence, rather than a result of classic reasonable doubt.
Even prosecutors who claim to have experienced the CSI Effect
firsthand apply the concept to classic reasonable doubt cases, rather than to
those boasting overwhelming evidence of guilt.41  Many cases involve
eyewitness testimony, itself known to be questionable,42 or traditional
physical evidence (e.g., a murder weapon, bullets or shell casings, proceeds
from the crime, a mask or jacket worn by the perpetrator, a car used to flee
org/Press/default.asp; Belcher, supra note 33. This survey was then crafted into a press release
and put on the county attorney's website. See id. The survey herein of ADAs, which asked for
specifics of CSI-affected cases, substantiates that such a belief in the CSI Effect exists, but shows
that the perception is not supported by fact.
35. It is not clear that the majority of prosecutors rely on only these two cases. Rather, it
appears that the media repeatedly cites the same few prosecutors (who offer these same
examples). These prosecutors evidently believe that Blake and Jackson were guilty, but
wrongfully acquitted due to the juries misinterpreting a lack of forensic evidence.
36. Cole & Dioso, supra note 21. A Los Angeles D.A. even called jurors who acquitted
Blake "incredibly stupid." Richard Winton, Blake Jurors 'Stupid,' D.A. Says, L.A. TIMES, Mar.
24, 2005, at B1. Robert Blake was accused of shooting his wife to death.
37. Cole & Dioso, supra note 21.
38. Id.
39. The jury's initial vote was 10-2 in favor of acquittal. Andrew Blankstein & Jean
Guccione, "CS!" Effect or Just Flimsy Evidence? The Jury Is Out, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 18,
2005, at Al.
40. Id. at A34. (reporting that one Blake juror said that the evidence presented hadn't proved
the prosecution's case, and another explained that they "went over every piece of evidence and
broke down every witness").
41. Mark Hansen, The Uncertain Science of Evidence, ABA J., July 2005, at 48, 53 (stating
that while many criminal defense attorneys dismiss the CSI Effect, "prosecutors swear it's real.").
42. BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: WHEN JUSTICE GOES WRONG AND HOW
TO MAKE IT RIGHT 55-100 (2001) (discussing problems with eyewitness evidence); Garrett L.
Berman & Brian L. Cutler, Effects of Inconsistencies in Eyewitness Testimony on Mock-Juror
Decision Making, 81 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 170 (1996) (finding that mock jurors found eye
witness testimony less effective if there is inconsistent testimony).
20071
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the scene, or a marked bill used to purchase drugs) as opposed to forensic
evidence (that discovered through or subjected to scientific tests43). For
instance, prosecutor Patricia Jessamy cited an acquittal in a first-degree
murder case, where the victim's wife and young daughter witnessed the
shooting." Jessamy interpreted an alternate juror's remark about the lack
of physical evidence tying the defendant to the murder as confirmation that
the CSI Effect had derailed the conviction.45 Lack of physical evidence,
however, is different than lack of forensic evidence, i.e., evidence
46discovered or proved through scientific tests. Hence, the alternate juror
was not necessarily referencing the absence of forensic evidence, but rather
other indicia of presence.47 In a similar vein, a jury consultant complained
that jurors in a rape-related civil case wanted DNA evidence, "even though
there was.. . clear evidence from the [emergency room] that the victim had
been raped., 48 Of course, medical records documenting forcible sex would
show only physical indicia of an assault, not who committed it.49 Forensic
DNA evidence, however, might be able to answer the question of identity.50
43. Cole & Dioso, supra note 21 (citing comments of Laurie Levenson); Allison Klein, Art
Trips Up Life: TV Crime Shows Influence Jurors CSI. The Expectation of Futuristic Hard-
Science Evidence Leads to Acquittals in Cases Prosecutors Thought Were Airtight, BALTIMORE
SUN, July 25, 2004, at IA.
44. Hansen, supra note 41, at 48, 53 (reporting that both the victim's wife and daughter
identified the defendant as the shooter).
45. Id. A different author also notes that a prosecutor attributed an acquittal to "lack of
physical evidence", but this is the same prosecutor and same case. See Houck, supra note 1.
46. Cole & Dioso, supra note 21 (citing comments of Laurie Levenson); Klein, supra note
43, at IA.
47. Volante & Smith, supra note 30 (A judge and some prosecutors have asserted that jurors
pose more questions and deliberations take longer than in the past). Despite these claims, they
have been unable to produce any statistical evidence that verifies a statistically significant
increase in acquittals, jury questions about forensics, or jury questions in general. Nonetheless,
even if the length or deliberations or number of jury inquiries had increased, without knowledge
of the strength and type of cases, the context of the jury questions posed, or time-keeping of the
length of deliberations in any case, let alone pre-CSI cases versus post-CSI cases, the validity of a
such assertions are untestable. Indeed, courts have consistently held that jurors posing a question
tells nothing of the strength of a case, validity of the defense, or bias. Rather, questions and facts
of deliberations are meaningful only in context/ relation to the witnesses, case presented, crimes
charged, issues argued, and legal instructions.
48. Robben, supra note 23. This consultant cited as a second example a property nuisance
simulation. Three mock juries found for the defense, because the plaintiff did not provide
evidence that toxic waste had contaminated the property. Id. Despite the consultant's opinion, it
would seem that proving the source of the nuisance, i.e., that it was toxic waste, would be critical.
49. Thus, notwithstanding the jury consultant's misunderstanding, medical records could
not prove that the defendant raped the plaintiff, though the DNA evidence sought by the jury
could. Tellingly, the jury consultant referenced no criminal finding against the civil defendant
(which would have been completed before the civil case and could have been introduced against
the defendant).
50. The study of ADAs reported herein substantiates that beliefs in a CSI Effect do not
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Accumulating evidence also casts doubt on the CSI Effect. Several
experts have called the CS! effect illusory51 or incompatible with existing
research.5 2  First, if CSI causes wrongful acquittals, 53 then acquittal rates
should have increased (or conviction rates should have decreased). To the
contrary, they have not. 5 Statistics from California, Texas, Illinois, and
New York show that juries in felony cases convict virtually the same
proportion of defendants as they did ten years ago (before CSI aired).55
This is true for crimes that are forensic evidence-intensive (such as rapes
and murders) as well as those that are not (such as thefts).56
Second, a CSI Effect runs counter to what is known about the
relationship between evidentiary strength and juror decision-making.
Those asserting a CS! Effect insist that evidence of guilt is overwhelming.57
Yet, research suggests that, where evidence of guilt is strong,58 jurors are
both most likely to convict and unlikely to be influenced by extra-legal
evidence.59 In other words, a case with overwhelming evidence of guilt is
the type of case that is most resistant to the influence of irrelevant
information. 60 Accordingly, cases boasting overwhelming evidence of guilt
should be especially immune from any influence of a television depiction.
D. Explaining Perceptions of the CSI Effect
Although these anecdotes do not prove a CSI Effect, they elucidate
reasons that members of law enforcement might believe in one. An
match the reality of the cases supposedly exhibiting it. See infra Part IV.A.
51. Houck, supra note 1, at 86; see also Tyler, supra note 15, at 1076 (stating that CSI effect
is overstated or nonexistent).
52. Tyler, supra note 15, at 1063 (stating that the "existing research does not provide [clear]
framework for understanding this effect"; opposite effect is "equally plausible"); see also id. at
1076-77 (leniency premise of CS! Effect questionable); Margaret Lillard, Researcher: Study
Finds 'CS! Effect' No Hindrance to Prosecutors, ASSOCIATED PRESS WORLDSTREAM, Feb. 16,
2006.
53. Acquittals could be due to the burden of proof increasing or misinterpretation of absent
forensic evidence. See Houck, supra note 1, at 86 (stating acquittals are the same for CS! viewers
and non-CSl viewers).
54. Charles Loeffler, Jury Trials and the Criminal Justice System, NEW REPUBLIC ONLINE,
June 7, 2006, http://www.tnr.com/doc-posts.mhtml?i-v060605&s=loeffer060706.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See supra notes 34-40.
58. It is not clear that overwhelming strength of evidence in favor of the defendant has the
same, let alone any, effect on verdicts. Thus, very weak evidence of guilt or very strong evidence
of innocence does not necessarily immunize against extra-legal evidence.
59. Dennis J. Devine et al., Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of Empirical Research on
Deliberating Groups, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 622, 700-01 (2001).
60. See id.
2007]
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advocate's proximity to a case can cause her to overestimate its strengths
and underestimate its weaknesses. 61 Research has shown that a person's
desire to win influences their cognitive model to fit with that desired
outcome.62 Throughout the decision making process, mental models shift
toward coherence; that is, the information is mentally constructed to
support a single conclusion.63 This coherence shift polarizes perceptions of
the evidence, so that individuals with a slight inclination toward guilt
"[a]mplify their perception of the case." 64
Conversely, evidence weakly probative of guilt will be ignored or
even transformed to create a mental model supporting guilt.65 Indeed, one
study showed that when individuals entrusted with assessing the
evidentiary strength of cases were confronted with accumulating
information against their original conclusion, those individuals did not
reassess their conclusions, but manipulated the new information to conform
to their original conclusion.66 Individuals may selectively attend to
evidence supporting their existing view and neglect information disputing
it, further justifying their pre-existing impressions.67
As a result, an advocate often finds his or her position the most
compelling one.68 In fact, research demonstrates that prosecutors tend to
overestimate the strength of their cases.6 9 Individuals who are highly
motivated to resolve crime or provide justice for victim, such as law
61. See Dan Simon, A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision
Making, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 511, 541-42 (2004). This phenomenon applies to everything from
placing a bet on a horse, where the closer in time that she gets to placing the bet, the greater the
gambler estimates her chance of winning, to playing the role of an attorney in an insurance case,
where participants believe their side is the strongest. Id. at 541.
62. Id. (describing the relationship between positive valence of winning and coherence with
desired outcome).
63. Id. at 544-45 (shifting toward state of coherence with emerging verdict).
64. Id. at 519.
65. Id. ("[E]vidence is bolstered from overall ambiguity to a belief beyond a reasonable
doubt.").
66. Cf Tyler, supra note 15, at 1069 (describing an "overbelief effect," where individuals
who wish to convict, when confronted with weak evidence tend to distort it to make it stronger
than it is.).
67. See, e.g., William Klein & Ziva Kunda, Motivated Person Perception: Constructing
Justifications for Desired Beliefs, 28 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 145, 146 (1992);
Lorraine Hope et al., Understanding PreTrial Publicity: Predecisional Distortion of Evidence by
Mock Jurors, 10 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 111, 117 (2004).
68. Simon, supra note 61, at 541.
69. Cf Tyler, supra note 15, at 1078 ("Prosecutors make unrealistic assessments as to the
strength of their cases relative to jurors' assessments."); see also Simon, supra note 61, at 541-42
(citing a research study in which mock attorneys believe that fairness and facts are on their side,
that their witnesses are more credible, and their client more likable).
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enforcement, are also more likely to overestimate the probative value of
evidence in favor of guilt. 70  Meanwhile, they attempt to maintain the
"illusion of objectivity" or believe that they are being objective.71
Additionally, prosecutors are privy to information that will never be known
by the jury. This information may contribute to the prosecutor's
overestimation of the weight of trial evidence. Hence, a prosecutor
encountering an acquittal may be mystified when the outcome is not as she
expected, and attempt to account for this in some way that maintains her
original belief. 73 Attributing an acquittal to a CSI Effect is one way of
maintaining that belief. It keeps the original assessment of guilt intact and
provides an explanation outside of the prosecutor's control. Further, the
CSI Effect cannot be disproved. (The fact that cases said to evidence the
CSI Effect exhibit weaknesses that the prosecutors citing them do not see
supports this suspicion.)
III. MEDIA THEORY
A. Television's Influence on Viewers
Although the lack of present data substantiating a CSI Effect does not
foreclose its possibility, it underscores the need for viable theory explaining
such an effect. Most theories that explain the relationship between
entertainment programming and viewer beliefs rely on cultivation.7 4 This
foundational theory of media influence 75 presumes that, under certain
70. See generally Tyler, supra note 15, at 1070 (coherence effects interact with pre-existing
attitudes regarding law and order).
71. Accord Hope et al., supra note 67, at 117; Tom Pyszcznski & Jeff Greenberg, Toward
an Integration of Cognitive and Motivational Perspectives on Social Interference: A Biased
Hypothesis-Testing Model, 20 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 297, 302 (1987).
72. See Tyler, supra note 15, at 1078.
73. Id.
74. Steven "Eggermont, Television Viewing, Perceived Similarity, and Adolescents'
Expectations of a Romantic Partner, J. BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA, 244, 248 (2004); see generally
George Gerbner et al., Growing Up With Television: The Cultivation Perspective, in MEDIA
EFFECTS: ADVANCES IN THEORY AND RESEARCH 17, 17 (Jennings Bryant & Dolf Zillman eds.,
1994).
75. Rebecca M. Chory-Assad & Ron Tamborini, Television Exposure and the Public's
Perception of Physicians, 47 J. BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA, 197, 199 (2003); see also John Sherry,
Media Saturation and Entertainment-Education, 12 COMM. THEORY 206, 211 (2002); Gerbner et
al., supra note 74, at 20 (George Gerbner is the forefather of this theoretical approach, which
grew out of The Cultural Indicators Project); Robert Goidel et al., The Impact of Viewing
Television on Perceptions of Juvenile Crime, 50 J. BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA 119, 121 (2006)
(Although some tenets of the theory have been challenged, it remains the base for understanding
television viewing's impact of viewer perceptions).
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circumstances, heavy exposure to a pattern of television content impacts
viewer conceptions of reality.76
According to the cultivation theory, television is society's
storyteller.77 Its pattern of character portrayals and narrative content both
teaches viewers about society and socializes them.78 The heavy, long-term
exposure to these recurrent messages cultivates in viewers common
perceptions of reality that mirror what they see on TV. 7 9 Thus, people who
watch a great deal of television come to: (1) perceive the real world as
resembling what they see on television, and (2) adopt attitudes conforming
to that visage.
80
In its crudest formation, cultivation supposes that if a viewer
constantly sees a lot of "x" on television, the viewer will presume that "x"
is common. 81 Thus, if a viewer sees a great deal of violence on television,
the viewer will presume that society is violent;82 if a viewer sees infallible
doctors on television, the viewer will believe that doctors are infallible;83 if
a viewer sees television judges yell at litigants, she will assume that judges
yell at litigants.84  Once this presumption takes root, it can penetrate the
76. Chory-Assad & Tamborini, supra note 75, at 199; Goidel et al., supra note 75, at 122;
See L. J. Shrum, Effects of Television Portrayals of Crime and Violence on Viewers'Perceptions
of Reality: A Psychological Process Perspective, 22 LEGAL STUD. F. 257, 260-62 (1998).
77. Shrum, supra note 76, at 257; Gerbner et al., supra note 74, at 18; JAMES SHANAHAN &
MICHAEL MORGAN, TELEVISION AND ITS VIEWERS: CULTIVATION THEORY AND RESEARCH 13-
14 (1999).
78. Michael J. Porter et al., Re(de)fining Narrative Events: Examining Television Narrative
Structure, 30 J. POPULAR FILM & TELEVISION 23, 28-29 (2002); Shrum, supra note 76.
79. Hyung-Jin Woo & Joseph R. Dominick, Acculturation, Cultivation, and Daytime TV
Talk Shows, 80 JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. QUARTERLY, 109, 110 (2003); Patrick Rossler &
Hans-Bernd Brosius, Do Talk Shows Cultivate Adolescents' Views of the World? A Prolonged-
Exposure Experiment, 51 J. COMM. 143, 146 (2001).
80. See Woo & Dominick, supra note 79; W. James Potter & Ik Chin Chang, Television
Exposure Measures and the Cultivation Hypotheses, 34 J. BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA 313, 313
(1990); Donald D. Diefenbach & Mark West, Violent Crime and Poisson Regression: A Measure
and a Method for Cultivation Analysis, 45 J. BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA 432, 432 (2001) (reporting
a positive correlation between statistically heightened depictions and beliefs in phenomenon).
81. See Chory-Assad & Tamborini, supra note 75, at 199 (noting that television and its
viewers interact in a multidirectional process in creating television's messages); Rick W.
Busselle, Television Exposure, Perceived Realism, and Exemplar Accessibility in the Social
Judgment Process, 3 MEDIA PSYCHOL. 43, 44-45 (2001) (noting that people who watch a heavy
diet of a particular type of programming will recall its lessons more easily and be more prone to
its influence in real life).
82. See Diefenbach & West, supra note 80, at 432-33 (heightened depictions of violent
crime).
83. Chory-Assad & Tamborini, supra note 75, at 199-200, 209 (changing depictions of
physicians).
84. See Podlas, Should We Blame Judge Judy? The Messages TV Courtrooms Send
Viewers, 86 JUDICATURE 38, 38-40 (2002) (discussing the depiction of judges on reality
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viewer's attitudinal base and become a decision-making factor.85 Hence, a
viewer who believes that society is violent may be more afraid to walk
alone at night, inclined to purchase a home alarm system, or likely to
support increasing the police force.86
Importantly, cultivation contemplates a long-term, cumulative effect
resulting from the heavy viewing of a flood of consistent messages.
87
Cultivation looks at the impact of heavy viewing and divides the world into
two groups: those who have been subjected to this flood (heavy viewers)
and those who have not (non-heavy viewers). 88 This is neither a corollary
impact (where two hours of viewing causes a lesser attitudinal impact and
200 hours of viewing causes a greater attitudinal impact) nor a single,
short-term, watch-this-now-what-do-you-think impact.89  In terms of
repeated viewing and repeated broadcasting, repetition is key.90
Though the classic cultivation theory9' looked at exposure to the
universe of television content,92 recent research suggests that exposure to
specific types of programs or genres is a better predictor of viewer
beliefs.93 To some degree, this recalibrates for proliferation of television
channels and consequent diversification of programming. Classic
television) [hereinafter Should We Blame Judge Judy?].
85. Shrum, supra note 76, at 261-62 (indicating that television's information is stored in
memory and when retrieved, can influence judgment).
86. See, e.g., Diefenbach & West, supra note 80, at 432; Busselle, supra note 81, at 43
(finding that heavier television viewers believed in higher estimates of violent crime); Rick W.
Busselle & L. J. Shrum, Media Exposure and Exemplar Accessibility, 5 MEDIA PSYCHOL. 255,
255 (2003) (stating that viewers are more likely to rely on information from television to develop
understandings of events or social constructs when they have little direct experience).
87. See Sherry, supra note 75, at 219.
88. See, e.g., L. J. Shrum & Valerie Darmanin Bischak, Mainstreaming, Resonance, and
Impersonal Impact: Testing Models of the Cultivation Effect for Estimates of Crime Risk, 27
HUMAN COMM. RES. 187, 189 (2001).
89. Such an impact would reflect traditional effects research, where the before/after
differences of exposure to a television message is measured. See Gerbner et al., supra note 74, at
20.
90. Sherry, supra note 75, at 212 (stating any message must rise to the level of "theme
saturation.").
91. For a history of cultivation theory and its maturation, see id.; Rossler & Brosius, supra
note 79, at 146 (discussing the early history of cultivation theory).
92. See Chris Segrin & Robin L. Nabi, Does Television Viewing Cultivate Unrealistic
Expectations About Marriage?, 52 J. COMM. 247, 259 (2002); see also Jonathan Cohen & Gabriel
Weimann, Cultivation Revisited: Some Genres Have Some Effects on Some Viewers, 13 COMM.
REP. 99, 212 (2000) (noting that cultivation accounts for effects of the dominant messages on
television).
93. Segrin & Nabi, supra note 92, at 259; Potter & Chang, supra note 80, at 330-31;
Rossler & Brosius, supra note 79, at 146; W. James Potter, Cultivation Theory and Research: A
Conceptual Critique, 19 HUMAN COMM. RES. 564, 575 (1993).
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cultivation theory considered a limited world where television showed only
100 channels and viewers watched twenty or fewer hours of television per
day.94 Therefore, since a heavy viewer could choose among only limited
options, the theory appropriately considered television's messages overall
and measured viewing of television as a whole.95
By contrast, the contemporary broadcast landscape can boast more
than 400 channels airing around the clock.96 As a result, today's heavy
viewer does not necessarily see the same flood of content as another heavy
viewer, but might choose different networks or genres of programming.
This particularized and varied universe of viewing options was not
contemplated by classic cultivation theorists. Consequently, modem
cultivation measures cultivation (or defines viewing) in terms of
proportional97 or genre viewing. 98  Provided portrayals are relatively
uniform within the television genre, heavy viewing of that genre best
predicts perceptions consistent with portrayals found in that program
type.99 Notwithstanding, both classic and modem cultivation theories focus
on the long-term impact or accumulation of consistently repeated imagery
or programming "bits"' 00 on television.l0 l
94. GEORGE COMSTOCK & ERICA SCHARRER, TELEVISION: WHAT'S ON, WHO'S
WATCHING, AND WHAT IT MEANS 3 (1999).
95. See id.; Gerbner et al., supra note 74, at 18, 21-22 (discussing the research strategy
underlining the Cultural Indicators Approach).
96. Typical expanded cable offers an average of 70-80 channels. See, e.g.,
http://www.timeswarnercable.com/socallproducts/cable/default.html.
97. Goidel, et al., supra note 75, at 121.
98. Cohen & Weimann, supra note 92, at 101-02. See generally Woo & Dominick, supra
note 79, at 114 (citing Potter & Chang, supra note 80).
99. Chory-Assad & Tamborini, supra note 75, at 199-200.
100. David Morley, Unanswered Questions in Audience Research, 9 COMM. REV. 101, 110
(2006).
101. See generally Maurice Vergeer, et a]., Exposure to Newspapers and Attitudes Toward
Ethnic Minorities: A Longitudinal Analysis, 11 HOw. J. COMM. 127, 130 (2000) (noting that
negative depictions of ethnic minorities on television in general leads viewers to perceive such
parties as a threat); Shrum & Bischak, supra note 88 (arguing that significant exposure to specific
types of entertainment programming cultivates attitudes in viewers).
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It is important to underscore that cultivation is rooted more in media
theory than psychology. 10 2 Whereas psychology might be concerned with
how cultivation works at an individual level (e.g., what psychological
processes underlie the effects of television viewing on social judgment,
what factors enhance recall, or why television information is used despite
suspect veridicality), media theory focuses on the precise role and effects
of media in a media-saturated environment. 10 3 Thus, the primary issues
pertain to discerning the circumstances under which the accumulation of
TV content exerts a measurable influence on viewers, and the type of
influence it exerts on them.
B. Television's Influence on Beliefs About the Law
Though legal scholars have been slow to recognize television as a
mediator of legal understandings, 10 4 they now acknowledge that television
impacts the public's understanding of law. 105 That television has such an
effect is hardly surprising. Because most people have little personal
experience with the legal system, 0 6 they rely upon television as a tutor. 1
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Indeed, research shows that law-oriented entertainment programming
can cultivate opinions regarding litigation and the behavior of judges,
attorneys, and even litigants. For instance, this author's previous multi-
year study demonstrates that television's reality courtrooms impact the
perceptions of heavy viewers, regarding appropriate judicial behavior, as
102. Sherry, supra note 75, at 209 (discussing that because social psychological theories
developed "without consideration of the role and function of media," they only peripherally
address contemporary media-saturation).
103. Id.
104. See SHERWIN, supra note 4, at 6 (proposing that the law may be affected by mass-
marketed visual images).
105. See e.g., Should We Blame Judge Judy?, supra note 84, at 38; ASIMOW & MADER,
supra note 4, at 11.
106. See Kimberlianne Podlas, Please Adjust Your Signal: How Television's Syndicated
Courtrooms Bias Our Juror Citizenry, 39 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 2-3 (2001) [hereinafter Please Adjust
Your Signal]; Elliot E. Slotnik, Television News and the Supreme Court: A Case Study, 77
JUDICATURE 21, 22 (1993) (stating that television provides a majority of the public with its only
information about the law); Exposing the Media Myth, supra note 14, at 429-31; Richard K.
Sherwin, Law and Popular Culture: Nomos and Cinema, 48 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1519, 1520-21
(2001); NEAL FEIGENSON, LEGAL BLAME: HOW JURORS THINK AND TALK ABOUT ACCIDENTS
(2000).
107. See, e.g., Please Adjust Your Signal, supra note 106, at 7-8, 15; Exposing the Media
Myth, supra note 14, at 429-31; see American Bar Association Report on Perceptions of the U.S.
Justice System, 62 ALB. L. REV. 1307, 1315 (1999). See generally SHERWIN, supra note 4
(discussing how television influences perceptions of the judicial system).
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well as perceptions of litigants, or litigation. 0 8 Consistent with the syndi-
court portrayal of judges as vocal, active interrogators who make moral
pronouncements, viewers who watched a significant amount of this genre
expected real judges to exude the same behavioral attributes.10 9 In other
words, heavy viewers of syndi-court believed that real judges would be
vocal, active, and opinionated on the bench, whereas their non-viewing
counterparts did not. 10
Also supporting a cultivation effect of legal entertainment
programming on viewer attitudes, Pfau and Menkel-Meadow each found
that television's regular portrayals of attorneys can impact viewer beliefs
about the behavior of real attorneys.' As was the case with syndi-court,
the attitudes of heavy viewers conformed to the images they saw on
television." 2 This author has similarly found that heavy viewers of syndi-
court-i.e., those constantly exposed to its parade of litigants and claims
regarding relatively small sums-came to perceive the behaviors they saw
on television (including those of litigants) to be relatively normal in the real
world. "3
108. Should We Blame Judge Judy?, supra note 84, at 40.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 40-42.
111. For findings by Michael Pfau, see generally Michael Pfau et al., Television Viewing
and Public Perceptions of Attorneys, 21 HUM. COMM. RES. 307 (1995) (proposing that content-
specific viewing is a powerful predictor of the public's tendency to perceive attorneys in the same
manner they are depicted on television). For findings by Carrie Menkel-Meadow, see Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Telling Stories in School: Using Case Studies and Stories to Teach Legal
Ethics, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 787, 815 (2000) (discussing use of legal narratives to teach about
legal ethics). See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Can They Do That? Legal Ethics in Popular
Culture: Of Characters and Acts, 48 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1305 (2001) (describing the depiction of
lawyers' ethics in the media); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Sense and Sensibilities of Lawyers:
Lawyering in Literature, Narratives, Film and Television, and Ethical Choices Regarding Career
and Craft, 31 McGEORGE L. REV. 1 (1999) (describing how depictions of lawyers affect
students' career choices).
112. See generally David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, What Law Students Think They
Know About Elite Law Firms: Preliminary Results of a Survey of Third Year Law Students, 69 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1213 (2001). In a similar vein, the public's perception of physicians tends to
correlate with television's shifting depiction of them. See generally Chory-Assad & Tamborini,
supra note 75, at 199-200.
113. See Kimberlianne Podlas, Broadcast Litigiousness: Syndi-Court's Construction of
Legal Consciousness, 23 CARDoZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 465, 494 (2005).
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C. The Importance of the Story's Message
That television can cultivate understandings does not mean that any
law-related program will do so. Rather, the narrative' 14 must achieve some
level of saturation.'' 5 This saturation is not quantified as a sum of two
hours broadcasted or viewed, 1 6 but described qualitatively as a flood of
information. 117  Thus, the depiction or program containing it must be
broadcast frequently. Obviously, if a program or depiction is broadcast
only periodically, the information amounts to only a drip or trickle, rather
than a flood.
In addition, viewers must "read"'1 8 that narrative or message, 19 and it
must be dominant enough to withstand dilution by competing messages. If
the message is too subtle, is contradicted by other information, is
overwhelmed by another message, or its narrative is inconsistent, it will be
inconsequential to viewers. The way in which factual content impacts
audiences appears somewhat inconsistent. Sometimes factual content
merely makes the audience aware of an issue (the agenda-setting effect); at
other times, it reinforces pre-existing attitudes; at still others, it seems to
have no impact on values or direction of response whatsoever. In many
instances, these differential impacts are due to inconsistent messages within
or across television programs, lack of sufficient repetition of a message, or
the fact that audiences understand stories differently than researchers
expect. 120 Instead of viewers understanding the message, the effect will be
as though the story was written in a foreign language, or as though its
volume were too low to be heard. Under such circumstances, because
114. "A 'narrative' is both a story that is told and the process of telling it." Kimberlianne
Podlas, 13 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 1 (2007) (pending publication; on file with author).
115. Sherry, supra note 75, at 219-20 (stating that the message must rise to the level of
"theme saturation").
116. Thus, one does not test for an effect after fifty hours of viewing or 10,000 hours of
viewing.
117. Syndi-court, for instance, is a genre broadcast several hours per day, five days per
week, with a very consistent pattern of message-both within each singular program, and across
the programs of the genre. The narrative, as comprised of the depictions ofjudges, litigants, and
the purpose of litigation, is simple, obvious, and quite similar from show to show. These
depictions can be applied to the world as a simple syllogism: judges yell on television, therefore
judges yell in real life. See generally Podlas, supra note 114.
118. Morley, supra note 100, at 109-10.
119. This premise is key to narrative analysis and narrative theory. See JONATHAN
BIGNELL, AN INTRODUCTION TO TELEVISION STUDIES 86 (2004) (discussing the semiotics of
television viewing).
120. See generally Podlas, supra note 114.
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viewers will not pick up on a message, it cannot wield an impact.
12
Moreover, the narrative's impact 22 is confined to the audience's
understanding of it.'2 3 Stories are polysemic,124 and audiences are active
interpreters of these stories. 125 Therefore, researchers cannot simply assign
a meaning to a legal narrative, or presume that it is understood the way
producers understand it.' 26 Instead, researchers must look to the way the
audience interprets it.'
27
The significance of the audience's identification and understanding of
a message is also applicable to legal programming.. For example,
entertainment and reality law programs commonly explicate simple legal
rules, such as basic contract or tort law.' 28 One might expect this deluge of
legal content to cultivate heavy viewers, as does behavioral content (such
as depictions of judges and litigation). On the contrary, tests reveal that
heavy viewers neither remember nor apply the dominant legal rules
repeated on syndi-court any better than do non-heavy viewers. 129
Apparently, viewers do not "read" this narrative or pick up on enough
concrete legal content for it to exert a discernable effect. 30  The
explanation for this lack of effect on viewers might be that the moral and
behavioral depictions in syndi-court programming are so dominant that
they overwhelm the legal content, or that the legal content is not even
"read" as part of syndi-court's story. Indeed, this legal content is unlike the
role of depictions (showing how a doctor acts) or of normative depictions
121. See generally id.
122. Here, "impact" refers to both an attitudinal effect and subsequent second-order effect
such as applying the attitude to decisions-e.g., a viewer believes that society is violent, and so
purchases a gun. See id.
123. See Paul Gewirtz, Victims and Voyeurs: Two Narrative Problems at the Criminal Trial,
in LAW'S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC ON THE LAW 135, 144 (eds. Peter Brooks & Paul
Gewirtz, 1996) (noting the primacy of audience interpretation in narrative analysis); see also
ASIMOW & MADER, supra note 4, at 11-12 (discussing process of creating meaning).
124. ASIMOW & MADER, supra note 4, at 11.
125. See Robert M. Cover, Foreward: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 19
(1983) (discussing multiple meanings of stories).
126. See generally BIGNELL, supra note 119. Narrative analysis studies the manner in
which we construct, deconstruct, and make sense of these narratives and apply them. It
blossomed in the 1980's across a variety of disciplines. SHANAHAN & MORGAN, supra note 77,
at 194-95; Exposing the Media Myth, supra note 14, at 452.
127. See, e.g., Alice Hall, Reading Realism: Audiences'Evaluations of the Reality of Media
Texts, J. CoMM. 624, 625 (2003) (stating that meaning-construction depends on differences in
audience interpretation of texts); Exposing the Media Myth, supra note 14, at 452.
128. This has been documented through content analysis, which systematically analyzes
amount and programmatic content broadcast. See generally Podlas, supra note 114.
129. See generally id.
130. See generally id.
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(showing what is commonly done, or what society's common reaction to a
behavior is) shown to have a cultivation effect.
D. The Story of CSI
CSI saturates television and has aired on primetime television for six
years.' 3' It is the top-ranked drama,132 and approximately twenty-five
million people watch the show. 133  It is also syndicated five days per
week. 34  This broadcast presence positions CSI as a potential source of
cultivation. 135 Upon watching the program, however, it is not clear that
CSI's story would produce an anti-prosecution sentiment. Fundamentally,
CSI is not "about" forensic techniques, rather it is about cops-albeit ones
trained in forensics-catching bad guys. 136  Though forensic tests help
narrow the field of suspects, 137 the crime is usually solved through the
standard tropes of good police work and confessions. Hence, forensics is
not the story, but a plot device used to advance the narrative of police
solving crimes (and being rather good at it).
Nevertheless, if forensics is read as the dominant narrative, the show
celebrates forensics as nearly perfect. 138  The CSI Effect presumes that
jurors misinterpret the absence of forensic evidence at trial, but CSI never
takes us into a courtroom-let alone a jury room. 139 Thus, viewers are not
131. The pilot debuted on October 6, 2000. IMDb.com, "CSI: Crime Scene Investigation"
Pilot (2000), http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0534724/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2007).
132. CSlguide.com, http://www.CSIguide.com/CSI.asp (last visited Jan. 14, 2007).
133. ABC Medianet, http://www.abcmedianet.com/pressrel/dispDNR.html?id=053106_05
(May 31, 2006) (listing CSI viewership for the 2005-2006 season at 24,860,000 people).
134. Mike Reynolds, 'CSI' Leads Spike TV Surge, Multichannel News, Sept. 13, 2004,
http://www.multichannel.com/article/CA452336.html?display=Top+stories.
135. Exposing the Media Myth, supra note 14, at 452 (Although CSI possesses an
undeniable pop cultural currency, it does not monopolize the airways or even log the airtime of
syndi-court. A primetime viewer of CSI would need to watch the show for more than two years to
accumulate the same level of exposure they could in one month of syndi-court viewing).
136. Although television presents a variety of legal depictions, the bulk of its contribution is
as a constructionist of crime and the criminal justice system. See generally Kenneth Dowler,
Media Consumption and Public Attitudes Toward Crime and Justice: The Relationship Between
Fear of Crime, Punitive Attitudes, and Perceived Police Effectiveness, 10 J. CRIMINAL JUSTICE
AND POPULAR CULTURE 109 (2003); see Erica Scharrer, Tough Guys: The Portrayal of
Hypermasculinity and Aggression in Televised Police Dramas, 45 J. BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA
615, 616 (2001) (noting that the "pursuit of criminals has long accounted for a substantial part of
the television schedule").
137. In addition to focusing in on specific suspects, forensic tests can exclude a possible
culprit. See Exposing the Media Myth, supra note 14, at 437-38.
138. Regardless of whether the perpetrator is brought to justice, he or she is identified. See
id. at 433.
139. Furthermore, if jurors construe the absence of inculpatory forensics against the
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taught that the prosecutor must present forensic evidence for the verdict to
be guilty (or that when the prosecutor does not do so, the only correct
verdict is not guilty). 141 Instead, they are taught that all of the scientific
investigation took place long before trial and led to the defendant's arrest.
Accordingly, there is no reason to believe that a juror upon noticing the
absence of forensic evidence will invert this narrative against the
prosecution. 14 1 It is equally likely that such a juror will interpret CSI's
dominant narrative (i.e., of perfect forensics identifying the guilty and
being the precursor to arrest) to mean that: (1) arrests are based on
forensics; (2) forensics proves guilt; and (3) therefore, anyone arrested and
on trial has already been proven guilty. This elevates forensics and equates
the defendant's status with already-proven actual guilt. Whether viewed
through the perspective of cultivation, narrative theory, or common sense,
it is difficult to see how this narrative could cultivate anti-prosecution
views.
IV. EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATIONS
A. Prosecutor Perceptions of the "CSI Effect"
Initially, the methodology of this study sought to investigate the CSI
Effect by using an actual criminal case in which a CSI Effect supposedly
had occurred (i.e., one in which guilt was proven beyond a reasonable
doubt but the jury misinterpreted the absence of forensic evidence and
wrongfully acquitted).
To find such a case, forty-two assistant district attorneys from the
New York area were solicited at a CLE event to help identify cases in
which they personally had seen a CSI Effect. Cooperating ADAs filled out
and returned a form that asked: 1
42
prosecution they may also construe the absence of exculpatory forensics against the defense. See
id. at 463.
140. Id.
141. Even if viewer-jurors seeing a glut of forensic testing on CSI believe that there is a glut
of forensic testing in reality, this belief does not translate into the syllogism underpinning
cultivation. For instance, a viewer who sees a great deal of crime on television, and thus believes
that there is a significant amount of crime in the real world, will not abandon that belief simply
because she walked outside one day and did not see crime. The "CSI Effect," however, inverts
the dominant narrative and employs negative induction.
142. A similar set of questions has recently been included in a CS1 "Impact" survey being
conducted among federal law enforcement officers in North Carolina.
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1. Do you believe that there is a CSI Effect (that CSI causes
jurors to wrongfully acquit in cases where there is proof of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt, but no forensic evidence)?
2. If so, has a CSI Effect occurred in any cases on which you
worked?
3. If the CSI Effect has occurred in one of YOUR cases, please
list the name of the case, county, dates, and any other identifying
information (such as defense counsel, crimes charged, etc.).
I had planned to locate the original court files and then transmit details to
defense attorneys who would review them and propose alternative
explanations (alternative to a CSI Effect) for acquittal.1
43
The purpose of the survey was to identify a CSI Effect case feasible
for study rather than to catalogue every New York City case in which a
losing prosecutor contemplated a CSI Effect. Once a majority of the
surveys (twenty-eight of the forty-two distributed) were returned, I
commenced researching each individual court file. 144 I began with twenty
CSI Effect cases 145 from New York County, 14 6 reviewing case files for
witness lists, jury questions, jury deliberations, charges, charge requests,
and any other information incorporating forensic evidence. I hoped to
identify the most promising cases (in terms of indicating a CSI Effect),
review them in greater detail (such as by obtaining transcripts or portions
thereof), and structure them as scenarios for testing.
1. Recollection Versus Reality
Although the ADAs involved in the study excelled in detailing cases
in which they asserted a CSI Effect, a review of those case files revealed
that their recollections were faulty. Of the twenty cases reviewed in which
a CSI Effect was reported, nineteen had resulted in convictions. Because
any CSI Effect (i.e., acquittal in the face of proof beyond reasonable doubt)
demands acquittal, convictions essentially disprove any potential CSI
143, Due to the cost of transcribing a trial transcript, I initially intended to focus on cases in
which a CSI Effect had been identified or presumed. If there had been an acquittal-a necessary
pre-requisite for the CSI Effect-no appeal would have been perfected, and therefore no
transcript would have been transcribed.
144, These court files were the original files maintained in the document rooms of the
respective county courthouses.
145. Twenty-two surveys mentioned New York County cases, but only twenty cases could
be confirmed. Additionally, three surveys mentioned the same case. The additional six surveys
noted cases in Brooklyn.
146. New York County was chosen out of convenience; it was the closest court, offered the
easiest access to court files, and contained the majority of cases referenced.
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Effect.
Since this ADA survey had been used to locate an adequate case for
study, the fact that so many CSI-infected cases were devoid of any CSI
Effect was initially deemed a false start and failure. In retrospect, the
survey data indicates that the CSI Effect is indeed more perception than
reality. Although there is no reason to believe that the New York County
ADAs have significantly different recollections than other ADAs, 50% of
all prosecutors believed that a CSI Effect exists even though it is unrelated
to reality.
2. Factors: The Fundamentals of Juror Decision-Making
Lacking a "real" CSI case, it became necessary to devise one.
Ensuring that the constructed scenario could adequately capture the alleged
phenomenon required identification of what underlies the CSI Effect. The
CSI Effect rests on several premises: (1) that CSI impacts viewers; (2) that
this impact remains through future jury service; (3) that CSI factors enter
into the decision-making process of viewer-jurors; and (4) that viewer-
jurors invert CSI's story of forensic investigations to harm the
prosecution.1 47 These premises converge to the central issue of whether
CSI factors influence the decision-making of CSI viewer-jurors as opposed
to non-CSI viewers. 148 Therefore, in constructing a scenario, it is important
to understand the jury decision-making process.
Factors are the elemental components of decision-making.
149
Research discloses that jurors 150 decide cases by assigning meaning to and
attempting to connect sets of factors. 5 ' By considering and combining
these pieces of information, 152 jurors determine whether the evidence
147. The CSI Effect, if operating in real cases, also presumes that any impact survives the
group deliberation process, the court's charges, and the reality of the case. This study, however,
is not constructed around a real case. Furthermore, as explained below, since this study is one of
the first to study the wrongful inclusion of CSI factors, it investigates individual verdicts, rather
than considering jury verdicts (which would implicate group deliberations).
148. Whether CSI factors impact the prosecution negatively is important only once it is
shown that such factors insinuate themselves into decision-making. Cf Simon, supra note 61, at
520-21 (discussing lack of dominance of one set of factors over another).
149. See id. at 520.
150. This applies to both individual jurors as well as juries.
151. See NORMAN J. FINKEL, COMMON SENSE JUSTICE: JURORS' NOTIONS OF THE LAW 65,
69 (1995) (describing how jurors are likely to use narrative thinking to understand cases);
SHERWIN, supra note 4, at 24, 26-27 (citing studies showing that jurors use common knowledge
to establish narrative patterns); see also Dan Simon, A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive
Coherence in Legal Decision Making, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 511, 561 (2004) (stating these factors
are influenced by pre-existing stories or are reconstructed into a story).
152. SHERWIN, supra note 4, at 24 (stating research shows that jurors put together pieces of
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establishes the elements of the crime charged, disposes of a defense, and
ultimately whether it proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Even factors
that are irrelevant,153 drawn from a juror's personal experience, objectively
incorrect, or biased can be ingredients in jury decisions. 5 4  Also, the
primacy of factors remains regardless of the psycho-legal model of
decision-making to which one subscribes, be it Bayesian,'55 Story Model, 56
coherence-based reasoning, 5
7 or variations of common sense justice.
5 8
Simon illustrates the point with an example of a person crossing the
street.' 59 When a pedestrian decides whether to cross the street, she will
first locate a crosswalk and look both ways for cars, or determine how
much time is left on a pedestrian crossing. If she sees cars, the pedestrian
might estimate their distance, speed, and number. Thus, she begins her
decision-making by considering factors, and then weighing them, in
relation to the ultimate decision whether to cross the street. If two cars per
second are speeding past at eighty miles per hour on a four-lane highway,
she will not cross. Conversely, if only one car is far on the horizon and
there is a green light in her favor, she will cross. The decision-maker, such
as the pedestrian, must collect information before she can weigh it and
decide whether to cross. 1
60
This is as true in the jury room as on the sidewalk. Hence, regardless
of the direction of evidence or the final result of acquittal or conviction,
jurors will begin by considering a set of factors evoked by the crime
information).
153. See Christy A. Visher, Jurbr Decision Making: The Importance of Evidence, II L. &
HUM. BEHAV. 1, 3 (1987) (stating personal attributes of jurors minimally affect veridical
judgments). Irrelevant or "extra legal" factors, i.e., those irrelevant to the determination of guilt,
include juror religion, whether the defendant smiles, and race or ethnicity. Id.
154. See id. (stating personal attributes of jurors such as age, gender, race and occupation
affect veridical judgments).
155. Kurt A. Carlson & J. Edward Russo, Biased Interpretation of Evidence by Mock
Jurors, 7 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 91, 91-92 (2001) (factors influencing decision-
making in Bayesian model).
156. Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Evidence Evaluation in Complex Decision Making,
51 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 242, 242-43 (1986) (stating decision-making as a sequence
of multiplicative products of prior opinion and diagnosis of each item of evidence).
157. Simon, supra note 61, at 520.
158. FINKEL, supra note 156, at 2 (proposing common sense justice theory). Even theories
urging the influence of strength of evidence (SOE) acknowledge the primacy of factors. See
Visher, supra note 158, at 2 (enumerating types of factors that impact decision making within
SOE).
159. See Simon, supra note 61, at 536 (stating decisions to cross streets are contingent on
one's experiences concerning vehicles and driver behavior).
160. Decision-making initially cannot be a function of the strength of evidence, for strength
of evidence is determined by reference to the factors.
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charged, evidence presented, or story told.16' As a result, decisions are
made within certain problem spaces and those spaces evoke the factors
considered. 162
Provided the issue is salient or evokes a particular crime or story, the
factors are generally the same regardless of the direction of the proof.
63
For example, in a robbery case where the issue is identity, jurors will likely
consider a multitude of factors, including any prior relationship between
the parties, the witness's eyesight, her ability to see, lighting, physical
obstructions, other mechanisms of proof, alternative theories, credibility,
vengeance, an alibi, and the defendant's whereabouts.164 Jurors do this
analysis whether there are nineteen perfectly sighted witnesses and video
footage, or a single witness caught by surprise on a dark and stormy
night.' 65 The verdict results from the assessment of those factors in relation
to the story, the evidence proffered, and the crime charged. Consequently,
determining whether CSI impacts viewer-jurors requires designing a
scenario that allows us to determine whether CSI viewers use CSI factors in
their decision-making.
3. Confirmation of Factors in Decision-making
A set of mock deliberation exercises confirm that juries consider the
same types of factors regardless of the weighing of evidence. 166  Two
scenarios were used, but in order to manipulate strength of evidence, each
was re-structured into a "complete evidence" ("C") and an "incomplete
evidence" ("INC") version. 67 Scenario I was a ticket scalping case. 168 Its
incomplete version was missing the testimony of the arresting officer
which was necessary to prove each element of the crime, therefore
presenting weaker evidence of guilt. Scenario II was a violation of a
probation case based on the possession of prescription drugs.' 69  Its
161. See Simon, supra note 61, at 520.
162. Id.
163. See infra Part III. C. (describing confirmatory study).
164. See Simon, supra note 61, at 536 (listing factors used by jurors in decision-making,
and giving examples of how crossing a street and eyewitness testimony both draw upon the
juror's background experience).
165. In a criminal case, the assessment of factors is compared to the story or elements of the
crime in order to determine the direction and strength of the evidence and, thus, the verdict. For
example, whether a witness could not see or could see very well, or that a video of a robbery is in
color, a close up, and clear, or rather fuzzy and poorly pixilated would be factors to be weighed.
166. This also presumes that juries do so prior to or as a way to assess strength of evidence.
167. Thus, each of the two scenarios had two versions, totaling four different scenarios.
168. The original trial transcript was fifteen pages long.
169. The original hearing transcript was twenty-four pages long.
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incomplete version was missing the testimony of a dispensing pharmacist,
which was necessary to prove each element of the crime, therefore
presenting weaker evidence of guilt.
The scenarios were deliberated by four mock juries. Each jury
contained five or six individuals randomly empanelled.170  These
individuals were jury eligible support staff (e.g., mailroom, duplication,
word processing, couriers, etc.) working at a public interest office.1
7
Jurors in each group independently read the scenario, and then, as a group,
"deliberated" to reach a verdict. One juror was chosen to conspicuously
tape-record and list the factors mentioned during deliberations. 172 Once a
verdict was reached, the respective juries read and deliberated on a second
scenario. The researcher reviewed the verdict sheets against the tape-
recordings to ensure that all factors mentioned in deliberations had been
recorded.1 73  These recordings were then translated into categories of
factors. 174 The factors mentioned by jurors deliberating on the incomplete
or weaker evidence scenarios were compared against the factors mentioned
by jurors deliberating on the complete or stronger evidence scenarios.
175
With the exception of questions about legal instructions or why charges
would be brought, the factors considered did not significantly differ
depending on completeness or strength of evidence. 76 The primary factors
170. While random, it was ensured that no group contained more than four college students.
171. Volunteer jurors received lunch and beverages in return for their participation.
172. To account for any order presentation effect, the scenarios were distributed as follows:
Scen. I (C) Scen. I (INC) Scen. 11 (C) Scen. II (INC)
Group 1 1 st 2nd
paired with G#2 G#2
Group 2 1 st 2nd
paired with G# 1 G#1
Group 3 2nd 1st
paired with G#3 G#4
Group 4 2nd 1st
paired with G#3 G#3
173. Where a factor was mentioned in deliberations, but not recorded, it was noted as an
addition to the list.
174. For example, both questioning whether the police officer was telling the truth and
saying "I'm not sure that's really believable" were categorized as "Credibility."
175. Because this pre-test is included only to explain how the theory is used to test the CSI
scenarios, details of the statistical analysis are not included.
176. For example, Scenario 11 (C), which included testimony of a pharmacist, also prompted
questions about whether the pharmacist was licensed. It was not deemed to be a significant
difference, since this could have no bearing on the determination of guilt. The incomplete
scenario did not include testimony from pharmacists and therefore would not prompt discussion
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considered by these juries included: credibility, motive to lie or interest in
the case, plausibility of story, and mens rea of the defendant.
4. CSI Factors in Juror Decision-Making
A set of mock deliberation studies was designed as a plausibility
demonstration of the CSI Effect. The study was not concerned with
whether CSI could have some type of effect under various evidentiary
scenarios or weights, but only with what law enforcement purported was
occurring-that rightful convictions are being subverted due to CSI factors
infecting juror decision-making.
177
Presumably, if CSI impacted verdicts (here, acquittals), we would
expect frequent viewers of CSI to rely on CSI factors in their verdict
decision-making (to a statistically greater degree than non-frequent
viewers). Thus, to determine whether CSI improperly impacted the
decision-making of CSI viewer-jurors, 178 1 compared the factors that
frequent CSI viewers considered in reaching verdicts with those that non-
viewers considered.
B. The Design of the Scenarios
Two factually balanced scenarios 179 were constructed. One recounted
an alleged rape,18 a crime common to CSI.' 8' Another featured a violation
of probation involving prescription drug possession. 82  The scenarios
of her credentials.
177. The first investigations into the CSI Effect began by looking at whether CS! factors
impact the veridical decision-making of CSI viewers. CSI factors impact verdicts only when it is
shown that CSI factors enter into decision making.
178. The CS! Effect (in its present incantation) is not about a balanced case; it is not about a
very close case where a juror reasonably could go either way. Neither is it about a case where the
presence or absence of forensic evidence might tip the scales toward acquittal. Rather, those
complaining of such an effect insist that despite evidence of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,
visions of CS! prevent conviction.
179. Pre-testing revealed that the legally relevant evidence was balanced, i.e., it did not
favor either party. Initially, each scenario was reviewed by one defense attorney and one
prosecutor.
180. Jury simulations commonly use rape scenarios. See Visher, supra note 158, at 8.
181. See generally FLAHERTY & MARRINAN, supra note 5.
182. Though some studies show that rape is assessed the same as other assault scenarios,
others show that extraneous factors can impact verdicts in various, seemingly contradictory,
ways. Consequently, a non-rape scenario was added. Compare Visher, supra note 158, at 8, with
Laura S. Guy & John F. Edens, Juror Decision-Making in a Mock Sexually Violent Predator
Trial: Gender Differences in the Impact of Divergent Types of Expert Testimony, 21 BEHAV. SC.
& L. 215, 229 (2003) (stating gender of women jurors in rape trials can produce variety of
seemingly inconsistent effects).
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neither referenced forensic evidence or tests, nor presented any critical
issues where forensic testing would be necessary. To study whether CSI
factors entered into veridical decision-making (when no forensic evidence
had been introduced or argued), forensic-oriented factors were excised.
Instead, they were limited to issues of credibility. Accordingly, the rape
scenario was structured as a "what happened" question (the victim claimed
the sexual intercourse was by force, whereas the defendant claimed it was
consensual) 83 and the violation of probation scenario rested on whether the
defendant had knowledge (such as whether he knew that the prescription he
filled for his mother was forged).
The evidence in the scenarios was balanced in that it presented two
competing, but equally viable, stories (one on behalf of the prosecution and
one on behalf of the defense). 184  In the context of a criminal case,
"balanced evidence" should not be confused with a "close case." A "close
case" occurs where the prosecution almost meets the burden of proof, but
fails to do so, whereas "balanced evidence" denotes some degree of
equality. 185 As relatively equal evidence does not definitively tilt the scales
beyond a reasonable doubt, it does not amount to a close case. This
distinction is a function of the mathematical difference between the
criminal burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, in which the scales
overwhelmingly drop in favor of guilt, and a balance of evidence, in which
the scales remain rather steady. Since the scenarios were balanced and
rested on credibility-something that could not be assessed through a
paper-pencil scenario 18 6-they directed a verdict of not guilty. "Directed
verdict" is used in a quasi-legal, rather than in a colloquial sense. 187 Since
183. Because the issue pertained to consent, not identity, forensic evidence could not shed
light on the critical issue of consent.
184. The only way to provide evidence on each side was to supply testimonial evidence on
behalf of each side. This may present other issues, since it implies that the defendant may have
some burden of production where there is none. Nonetheless, this would not harm the
prosecution.
185. Suppose a prosecutor amasses evidence making it eighty-eight percent likely that the
defendant committed the crime. Although the evidence clearly favors guilt, it fails to meet the
beyond a reasonable doubt burden necessary for conviction. The case would not be close, i.e.,
almost amassing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, because the evidence does not come close to
definitively tilting the scales, but the verdict would be not guilty.
186. The only way to determine that guilt was proven beyond a reasonable doubt would be
to see and hear the witnesses, and determine that one was far more credible than the other.
Because the paper-pencil scenario prevented respondents from doing so, it was not possible to
prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. As a result, a not guilty verdict is the only legally correct
one. Exposing the Media Myth, supra note 14, at 458-59.
187. A scenario or evidence that "directs a verdict" is one in which as a matter of law "no
other reasonable conclusion is legally deducible from the evidence." 40 CAL. JUR. 3D,
JUDGMENTS, § 93 (3d ed. 2006).
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it was not possible to assess which side was telling the truth, it was not
possible to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Hence, each scenario
could result only in a not guilty verdict.
A balanced scenario was chosen over one heavily weighted toward
guilt for a number of reasons. What little research exists regarding the
impact of extra-legal factors (such as non-evidentiary CSI factors) on
decision-making suggests that they matter only in balanced cases.
188
Similarly, where there is strong evidence of guilt, jurors will more likely
convict without being influenced by extraneous variables or legal
evidence. 189 Hence, a balanced evidentiary environment is the best one in
which to test for the influence of extra-legal factors. By contrast, crafting
an absolute conviction scenario could obscure a CSI Effect where there is
one or imply an effect where there is not one.
Moreover, creating a functional scenario weighted toward guilt
borders on the impossible. First, it presumes an underlying premise that is
not testable-that the evidence constructed must result in a guilty verdict.
Second, it is questionable whether "resulting in guilt" can be operationally
defined. There is no agreement on "what makes a case compelling," let
alone an accepted metric to quantify strength of evidence.' 90 Third, such a
scenario ignores the defense, strength of witnesses, re-conceptualization of
evidence via cross-examination, and closing arguments. 19' It also
disregards the fact that the defense need not present an alternative story or
alibi, but may simply cite the prosecution's failure to meet its burden.
Additionally, weighting the evidentiary scenario so as to preclude any
conclusion other than guilt, regardless of the best defense, might cause it to
lose any semblance of reality. Indeed, the instant study pre-tested seven
guilt-weighted scenarios, yet could not create one that consistently
produced a guilty verdict. 192  Thus, the study utilized two balanced
scenarios.
188. Carlson & Russo, supra note 155, at 91-92.
189. Id.
190. See Devine et al., supra note 59, at 686.
191. Indeed, sometimes forensic evidence is relevant to guilt or innocence, or can shed light
on the case. See BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: WHEN JUSTICE GOES WRONG
AND How TO MAKE IT RIGHT, 218-19 (2001).
192. Cf Irwin A. Horowitz, et al., Effects of Trial Complexity on Decision Making, 81 J.
APPLIED PSYCH. 757, 757 (1996) ("[D]efinitions of trial complexity are elusive.").
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C. Mock Deliberations
Three mock deliberation studies were conducted sequentially, over
eleven months. 193  Deliberation #1 comprised a mock jury of 306
undergraduate and graduate students enrolled in summer academic and
review courses at a large state university in the Northeastern United States.
Deliberation #2 comprised a mock jury of 134 jury-eligible adults drawn
from graduate students enrolled in summer academic and review courses at
the same university used in Deliberation #1. And, Deliberation #3
comprised a mock jury of 98 individuals appearing for jury duty in New
York. This information is repeated in Chart I below.
Mock jurors completed a survey regarding their CSI viewing habits. 1
94
Next, they read a brief scenario, recorded their respective verdicts on an
attached verdict sheet, and ticked the "reasons" that impacted them.
Respondents who found the defendant not guilty were asked whether any
of the following factors impacted their decision: 195
1. Victim has reason to lie
2. Evidence not tested for fingerprints
3. Defendant may have committed offense BUT prosecution did
not prove beyond a reasonable doubt
4. Prosecution did not perform forensic tests that could have
shown Defendant was innocent
5. No DNA evidence / no DNA test completed
6. Defendant's story seemed more believable
7. Prosecution did not perform forensic tests to prove Defendant
was in apartment or bedroom
8. Other
193. Exposing the Media Myth, supra note 14, at 429 (describing the first portion of this
study). See generally Houck, supra note 1, at 86 (referencing the previous study as the only CSI
Effect study in existence, and expressing the need for further studies of the CSI Effect, which the
instant study addresses).
194. This used two axes of self-report data. Respondents quantified their viewing on a
forced-choice scale of hours per month and then described their viewing habits using a Likert-
type scale. The survey also asked about general television viewing and law-related television
viewing habits.
195. This was modeled on a survey used by Kuhn's team to study factors influencing mock
juror decisions (to assess their reasoning skills) and has been endorsed by others. See Monica L.
McCoy et al., The Effect of Jury Deliberations on Jurors' Reasoning Skills, 23 L. & HUM.
BEHAV. 557, 563 (1999).
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D. Analysis and Results
1. Analysis
To isolate any connection between CSI viewing and the use (in
verdicts) of CSI factors, researchers identified respondents as either heavy
viewers or non-heavy viewers of CSI. Since the issue is whether CSI
affects viewers who might later become jurors, impact is measured at the
individual (juror) level rather than the group (jury) level. 196  Due to the
number of interacting variables inherent in the group process, viewing jury
verdicts before establishing impact at an individual level could mask any
CSI Effect. Masking could occur in situations where the CSI Effect
actually influenced an individual but the CSI Effect is not apparent in the
resulting group verdict because of the balance within the deliberatory
group.
19 7
Furthermore, since the CSI Effect can exist only if there is an
acquittal, this analysis focused on not guilty verdicts.198 If CSI impacted
heavy viewers of the program, then CSI factors should enter into their
decision-making. Hence, viewers influenced by CSI would consider
reasons 2, 4, 5, and/or 7 (CSI factors).
196. The consideration of the group might be important if embracing a sociological or
psychological perspective, or if CS! was previously determined to exert an individual impact. It
is not, however, an appropriate initial inquiry.
197. That the verdicts here were individual ones should not alter the results. The issue (as
in most cultivation research) is whether program content influences heavy viewers differently
than non-heavy viewers. Thus, we measure any impact at an individual level, and presume that if
there is an effect, it will follow the viewer if she becomes a juror. If the deliberation took place in
a group setting, it might obscure a CSI Effect or be confounded with some other factor.
198. Additionally, surveys that were internally inconsistent or incomplete were discarded.
The difference between "total respondents" and "total usable verdicts" is reflected in Chart I.
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CHART I
Mock Mock Total Scenario Total Acquittals Acquittal
Deliberation Jurors Respondents Usable rate
Sequence Verdicts
#1 - Summer Undergrad/ 306 Rape 291 250 95%
2005 grad
students
#2 - Spring Jury-eligible 134 Rape 54 52 96%
2006 adults Ticket 61 60 98%
scalping
#3 - Summer Individuals 98 Rape 47 46 97%
2006 on jury duty Ticket 41 41 100%
I I scalping
CHART II
MOCK DELIBERATION #1: FACTORS USED IN DECISION-MAKING
CSI Viewer Acquittals Jurors using Jurors using Jurors using 3 Jurors Using
Profile (n=250) 1 or more 2 or more or more CSI 4 CSI factors
CS! factor CSI factors factors
Heavy 187 8 5 2 0
Viewer
Non-heavy 63 5 4 1 0
Viewer
Statistically No No No No
significant 199
199. Statistical analysis examined the relationship between CSI viewing and factors used in
veridical decisions (i.e., the inclusion of CSI factors). The use of ANOVA (a statistical term for
analysis of variance between two groups of different sizes) determined whether heavy viewers of
CSI were influenced by CSI factors more than were non-heavy viewers. This was tested at p >
0.05 level of significance.
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CHART III
MOCK DELIBERATION #2: FACTORS USED IN DECISION-MAKING
CS1 Viewer Acquittals Jurors using Jurors using Jurors using 3 Jurors Using
Profile (n=1 12) 1 or more 2 or more or more CSI 4 CSI factors
CSI factors CSI factors factors
Heavy 84
Viewer
- rape 38 3 2 1 1
- tkt scalping 44 2 1
Non-heavy 31
Viewer
-rape 13
- tkt scalping 15 1 1 1
Statistically No No No No
significant
CHART IV
MOCK DELIBERATION #3: FACTORS USED IN DECISION-MAKING
CSI Viewer Acquittals Jurors using Jurors using Jurors using 3 Jurors Using
Profile (n=87) 1 or more 2 or more or more CSI 4 CSI factors
CSI factors CSI factors factors
Heavy 67
Viewer
- rape 31 2 1
- tkt scalping 35 2 1
Non-heavy 21
Viewer
-rape 15 1 1 1
- tkt scalping 6 1
Statistically No No No No
significant No 
No No
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CHART V
COMBINED ACQUITTAL RESULTS
CSI Viewer Jurors using 1 Jurors using 2 Jurors using 3 or Jurors Using 4
Profile or more CSI or more CSI more CSI factors CSI factors
factors factors
Heavy 17 10 3
Viewers
(n=338)
Non-heavy 8 6 3 0
Viewers
(n= 15)
2. Narrative Summary of Results
As reflected in Charts II, III and IV, the data did not disclose any
statistically significant difference between the factors used by heavy and
non-heavy CSI viewers. This was true whether deliberation sample groups
(Groups 1-3) were considered independent of one another (Charts II, III,
IV) or as a total sample as intended (Chart V). This was also true whether
the scenarios were considered separately or together. There were also no
apparent differences in the reasons for those acquittals (i.e., there was no
evidence that CS! factors played a part in the verdicts of CS! viewers to any
greater degree than those of the non-viewers). Indeed, it appeared that CSI
factors were irrelevant in both instances.
E. The Lack of Empirical Evidence of a CSI Effect
Despite claims to the contrary, the empirical data does not show any
anti-prosecution CSI Effect. Nothing indicates that heavy CSI-viewing
jurors consider CSI factors in reaching verdicts any more than non-heavy
viewers. In fact, only a small portion of either group stated that any CSI
factors informed their verdicts. 200 Hence, it does not appear that CSI
200. Although the 538 respondents do not perfectly reflect an actual jury, the sample
included 98 individuals who were on jury duty as well as 134 jury eligible college students. Cf.
McCoy et al., supra note 195, at 573 (stating that jury studies using college students are virtually
identical to jury studies using community members in respect to verdict or victim ratings). This
diversity created a more realistic jury than the commonly used sample of college students since it
reduces several issues regarding verisimilitude. Brian H. Bornstein & Sean G. McCabe, Jury
Decision-making: Jurors of the Absurd? The Role of Consequentiality in Jury Simulation
Research, 32 FLA. ST. L. REv. 443, 444 (2005) (discussing issues in jury simulations and
methods to overcome).
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factors influence the veridical decision-making of CSI viewers2
Accordingly, CSI viewing does not appear to lead to a CS! Effect which
results in wrongful acquittals. 2  Apparently, audiences either do not watch
CSI in the way that prosecutors fear or do not pick up on any anti-
prosecution message in the narrative. Instead, viewers might read the story
as just another show where police catch bad guys, but not connote any
negative meaning to the narrative about forensics.
20 3
These results, however, cannot definitively prove that CSI has no
effect. The experimental design prevents interpreting them as a conclusive
cause and effect. 20 4  As with most cultivation studies, external variables
may impact the results. 20 5  "Some authors [have] questioned whether
exposure to [certain] television [messages is a] cause or [an] effect or both
....,206 Moreover, though mock juror20 7 or jury simulations permit
researchers to control factors (thereby increasing the precision of inquiry),
208they can also limit the external and ecological validity.
Methodological qualifications notwithstanding, this set of studies is
not alone in casting suspicion on claims of an anti-prosecution CSI Effect.
The ADA survey,20 9 while not offering experimental design or conclusions
supported by algorithms, provides tremendous insight. Nineteen of twenty
prosecutors detailed instances where CSI had impacted their cases.210 Yet,
a review of the case files confirmed that there was no such impact, at least
201. Because the CSI Effect is premised on CSI viewers becoming jurors and then
employing CSI infected reasoning to their veridical decisions, and CSI viewers appear to be no
different than non-viewers, there is no reason to believe that this would be any different at trial.
202. Hence, there is either no CSI Effect or no CSI Effect based on viewing profile.
203. Indeed, a multi-layered and complex process is necessary for a CSI Effect. Yet, a
majority of research regarding cultivation theory and television's role in heuristic decision-
making is premised on attitudinal formation rather than multi-level extrapolation of issue-specific
content to broader applications, such as jury decision-making. See generally Vergeer et al., supra
note 101.
204. The only way this would be possible is to control every aspect of a person's
environment from the day she is born.
205. Future research should sample different audiences and consider other variables such as
the motivations for viewing, prior justice system experiences, and the perceived reality of these
shows to see if they have an impact on cultivation:
206. Vergeer et al., supra note 101, at 130.
207. Research has repeatedly shown that group verdicts correspond closely to individual
pre-deliberation early preferences. Simon, supra note 61, at 550. Consequently, the individual
deliberation should not alter the results here.
208. Here, jurors did not deliberate as a group, but individually. In all instances, mock jurors
did not sit though real trial but read transcripts or truncated scenarios.
209. As previously noted, one prosecutor-to-prosecutor survey found that most prosecutors
believe in an effect to their detriment.
210. See infra Part IV.D.I.
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not a negative one. The disparity between the sincerity of their belief and
reality suggests that the CSI Effect is a myth that exists in the minds of its
acolytes.
V. THE BENEFIT OF CS! TO PROSECUTORS
If there is a CSI Effect, narrative theory and common sense suggest
that it will benefit law enforcement. 211  As noted, CSI features the
fantastical world of forensics and smart police work. Even the forensic
scientists that fear a CSI Effect admit that CSI's depictions are of the "'near
infallibility of forensic science."' 21 2 This story may cultivate the notion
that forensic scientists and their methods are legitimate and reliable, thus
bolstering the prosecution's case.213 In addition, jurors who are motivated
to punish a wrongdoer can exaggerate the value of scientific evidence,
perceiving it as overly conclusive. a 4 Indeed, scientific evidence is very
seductive to jurors, and they tend to overvalue its probity and overestimate
its infallibility.215
Though television portrays police forensics as neutral, legitimate
science, it is neither.21 6 Forensics is not premised on the objectivity and
methodology of science,21 7 but on the subjective determinations of law-
enforcement-trained technicians.21 8 Most crime labs are an arm of law
enforcement, staffed by police in lab coats. 219 In fact, the DNA
identification technique was developed as a prosecutorial weapon to
211. CSI might produce a different effect where believing in a CSI Effect, even if incorrect,
causes law enforcement to alter their presentation of cases or forensic investigatory protocols.
212. Weiss, supra note 19, at A13 (quoting Max Houck that the effect occurs "after
watching a few episodes of CS!'). Houck is also the author of a Scientific American article
warning that the CS! Effect may be impeding prosecutions and improperly diverting jurors. See
Houck, supra note 1.
213. Tyler, supra note 15, at 1065 (CSI's plotlines converge with the psychological need for
closure following crime).
214. Id. at 1084. Additionally, CSIs focus on bringing wrongdoers to justice is consistent
with a strong psychological need to achieve closure. Id. at 1065. Where jurors are inclined to
convict in the face of weak evidence, they may distort it, believing it to be stronger than it is. Id.
at 1069.
215. Id. at 1068 (describing studies showing that people view evidence as more probative
than it is); United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (warning that scientific
evidence can "assume a posture of mystic infallibility in the eyes of a jury"); Edward
Imwinkelreid, The Next Step After Daubert: Developing a Similarly Epistemological Approach to
Ensuing the Reliability of Nonscientific Expert Testimony, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2271, 2286
(1994).
216. Cf Tyler, supra note 15, at 1070 (2006).
217. Cooley, supra note 17, at 390-91.
218. Id.
219. J. Herbie DiFonzo, The Crimes of Crime Labs, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 4-5, 11 (2005).
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confirm the identity of a presumed suspect, and not as an investigatory tool,
as portrayed on CSI.220  Indeed, the etymology of "forensics" is not the
designation of a specialized field of science, such as a physician might
specialize in oncology, but a label for the quasi-science practiced by
police.22'
Forensic investigators have even fabricated evidence or lied under
~222oath. In one particularly appalling example, West Virginia state
serologist Fred Zain fabricated DNA results in hundreds of cases, including
some which were death-penalty-eligible. 3  The fabricated test results,
along with Zain's own perjured testimony, led to the convictions of dozens
224laof individuals throughout West Virginia and Texas. This law
enforcement disposition diminishes the neutrality of science and may lead
to biased conclusions. 5
Aside from potential procedural bias, the underlying science of
forensics itself is questionable, as some of it barely qualifies as science at
all.226 In fact, many of the "standard" techniques have either never been
endorsed by the scientific community or they lack validation studies to
support their premises.2 7 For example, the FBI only began investigating
the reliability of fingerprint identification, the quintessential technique for
criminal identification, in the 1990s.22 8  Moreover, contrary to popular
perception, fingerprint identification does not match one complete
fingerprint to another, but compares "points of similarity. '229  Under
current practice, if any range from eight to sixteen (of a fingerprint's thirty-
five to fifty) points is similar, a fingerprint is declared a match.230
220. Christopher H. Asplen, From Crime Scene to Courtroom: Integrating DNA Technology
into the Criminal Justice System, 83 JUDICATURE 144, 146 (1999).
221. Cooley, supra note 17, at 390.
222. Police forensic personnel in New York City, Maryland, the FBI, and the Army have all
falsified test results. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
THE FBI DNA LABORATORY: A REVIEW OF PROTOCOL AND PRACTICE VULNERABILITIES (May
2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/0405/index.htm.
223. In re Investigation of the West Virginia State Police Crime Lab., Serology Div., 438
S.E.2d 501, 503 (1993); Roane, supra note 1 (showing in one instance, Zain contributed to the
conviction of an innocent man who had been sentenced to a term of 203-335 years).
224. Roane, supra note 1, at 52.
225. DiFonzo, supra note 219, at 4-5 (noting that technicians working in police labs come
to see themselves as "police in lab coats").
226. See Fingering Fingerprints, ECONOMIST, Dec. 16, 2000, at 89.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. See id.
230. Id.; see also Simon A. Cole, Grandfathering Evidence: Fingerprint Admissibility
Rulings from Jennings to Llera Plaza and Back Again, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1189, 1196 (2004)
(explaining that such a match between latent and scanned prints is called an "absolute" or
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Although such a match implies a conclusion as to identity, nobody has ever
proved the validity of relying on such a small number of points of
similarity to declare that no other finger in the world produced the print.
231
According to scholars, the verifiability of fingerprint identification rests on
the notion that "it is verifiable because [fingerprint technicians] use it."
232
Despite this circular logic, the reliability of fingerprint identification goes
unquestioned.233  Scholars, scientists, and courts have also begun
questioning the accuracy of ballistics, 234 hair analysis, 235 and handwriting
identification. 236 For example, two years ago, the National Research
Council of the National Academies released a study challenging the
scientific validity of the FBI's "comparative bullet-lead-analysis"
technique, which purports to match bullets to crimes by analyzing their
lead content.237 As a result, an appellate court recently reversed a murder
and robbery conviction based in part on its conclusion that the FBI crime
lab was scientifically flawed.238
Even where forensic tests qualify as legitimate "science,"
entertainment media perpetuates the misguided notion that forensics is
immune from mistake.239  CSI features brilliant scientist-cops employing
exacting methods and drawing conclusions that are never faulty-at least
when it comes to the forensic evidence. Such a portrayal of absolute
certainty might lead jurors to overestimate the accuracy of crime scene
"positive" match).
231. Fingering Fingerprints, supra note 226, at 89; see also Cole, supra note 230, at 1196.
232. Rebecca Parrott Waldren, Expectations and Practical Results in Fingerprint
Technology: Where Is the Line Drawn?, 31 J. LEGIS. 397, 406 (2005) (quoting Michael Mears &
Therese M. Day, The Challenge of Fingerprint Comparison Opinions in the Defense of a
Criminally Charged Client, 19 GA. ST. U.L. REv. 705, 711 (2003)).
233. Tamara F. Lawson, Can Fingerprints Lie?: Re-Weighing Fingerprint Evidence in
Criminal Jury Trials, 31 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 3 (2003-04) (reliability goes unquestioned); see also
Simon A. Cole, More Than Zero: Accounting for Error in Latent Fingerprint Identification, 95 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 985, 1034 (2005) ("presumption of infallibility") [hereinafter More
Than Zero].
234. See generally New Jersey v. Behn, 868 A.2d 329 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005)
(reversing a murder and robbery conviction because the FBI crime lab technique that "matches"
bullets to crimes by analyzing their lead content is scientifically flawed).
235. Model Prevention and Remedy of Erroneous Convictions Act, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 665,
667 (2001); Paul C. Giannelli, Scientific Evidence on Civil and Criminal Cases, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
103, 118-19 (2001) (courts have re-examined and disallowed hair analysis); Williamson v.
Reynolds, 904 F. Supp. 1529, 1556 (E.D. Okla. 1995).
236. Michael J. Saks, Merlin and Solomon: Lessons from the Law's Formative Encounters
with Forensic Identification Science, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1069, 1094-1100 (1998) (outlining
history of handwriting analysis).
237. See Mark Hansen, Bullet Proof A.B.A. J., Sept. 2004, at 58.
238. See generally Behn, 868 A.2d at 329.
239. Cooley, supra note 17, at 394.
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evidence or to believe it to be more conclusive than it is.
240
These portrayals are inconsistent with the realities of forensic testing,
its labs, and technicians. For instance, neither forensic technicians nor the
crime labs in which they work need to be accredited or certified.24' Thurs,
history "is littered with slapdash forensic analyses often performed by
untrained, underpaid, overworked forensic technicians operating in crime
labs whose workings reflect gross incompetence or rampant corruption. 2 42
Typically, testing is not in a research lab at a major institution resembling
the pristine set of CSI. 243 Poor testing conditions reduce the reliability of
results. Unbeknownst to the average citizen,244 different technicians often
have varying interpretations of DNA.245
Sometimes, forensic technicians are sloppy, use unproven methods,
manufacture data points, or ignore inconsistent results.24 6 For example,
experts from one well-known laboratory, Lifecodes, confessed that when
faced with DNA bandshifts that did not quite match, they used a previously
not-yet-validated methodology to reconcile the difference and declare a
match. 247  There is also a surprising amount of cross-contamination,
mislabeling, and mixing-up of DNA samples, switching the DNA amongst
cases. 248 One lab matched a slug with the wrong test gun,249 and another
confused the DNA reference sample of a rape victim with that of the
accused.250 In a particularly shocking known instance, the prosecution's
240. See, e.g., William C. Thompson, Tarnish on the "Gold Standard": Understanding
Recent Problems in Forensics DNA Testing, 30 CHAMPION 10, 15 (2006) (noting that people
believe DNA conclusions are infallible).
241. DiFonzo, supra note 219, at 3-4. As of 2005, only 294, of more than 1,000, crime labs
have passed accreditation with the American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors. Id.
242. Id. at 2.
243. DiFonzo, supra note 219, at 8 (citing the Detriot Crime Lab where testing is conducted
at a former elementary school building suffering from power surges, water leaks, and lack of
storage space).
244. Thompson, supra note 240, at 15 (noting that people believe DNA conclusions are
infallible).
245. Roane, supra note 1, at 53; see also Sheila Jasanoff, What Judges Should Know About
the Sociology of Science, 77 JUDICATURE 77, 78 (1993) (discussing how scientific claims are
contingent on a variety of factors, so that results are never completely true).
246. See Jasanoff, supra note 245, at 79.
247. Id.
248. Thompson, supra note 240, at 10-11.
249. See Steve McVicker, Ballistics Lab Results Questioned in 3 Cases, HOUS. CHRON.,
Mar. 14, 2005, available at http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpllspecial/crimLlab/3083288.html.
250. Roane, supra note 1, at 49. See Adam Liptak, Houston DNA Review Clears Convicted
Rapist, and Ripples in Texas Could Be Vast, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2003, at A14 (stating that
DNA evidence did not match suspect); see also DiFonzo, supra note 228, at 6 (discussing a
contamination rate of two percent in DNA testing).
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forensic evidence "'proved' that the probability of a coincidental match
was 1 in 694,000 African-American males. In fact, subsequent testing by
an independent private laboratory showed that the probability of a match
exceeded 1 in 8 . . .,,25 Even further, "the Crime Lab failed to present
DNA evidence which should have excluded [the defendant] as one of the
,,252 DNrapists. Yet, DNA's cloak of "science" can mislead jurors into either
ignoring contradictory evidence or foreclosing consideration of
corroborating evidence. 253 "Once the laboratory inputs a conclusion into
the criminal justice [system], it has effectively terminated whatever
processes it has in place to detect errors.' 25 4 Accordingly, notwithstanding
reasonable doubt, a jury may be more inclined to convict.255
VI. CONCLUSION
The mock juror deliberation and ADA survey results do not offer any
evidence that a CSI Effect is seducing jurors into legally unjustifiable
acquittals, but that, like its namesake television show, is merely fiction. If
anything, CSI's pro-police, pro-forensics story exalts forensics evidence,
thereby bolstering it along with the prosecution's case. Consequently, the
CSI Effect does not warrant criminal justice reforms or increased latitude
for prosecutors.
What is labeled a CSI Effect may more accurately be described as a
rationalization embraced by members of law enforcement who find
themselves on the losing side of a prosecution. By attributing a loss to
CSI's wrongful influence, a prosecutor can obtain an explanation yet
maintain a belief that an acquittal was misguided. Although this cognitive
rationalization is understandable, it should not be mistaken for empirical
proof that the CSI Effect operates anywhere other than in the minds of
those proposing it.
251. DiFonzo, supra note 219, at 5.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 2.
254. More Than Zero, supra note 233, at 995-96.
255. See Randolph N. Jonakait, Stories, Forensic Science, and Improved Verdicts, 13
CARDOZO L. REV. 343, 345 (1991) (discussing how jurors are more inclined to believe forensic
evidence over confessions and alibis).
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